Publications

Publications2022-09-13T13:30:26+00:00

Journal Articles

2024: In Europe We Trust: Selecting and Empowering EU Institutions in Disruptive Circumstances, Journal of European Integration 46(2): 235-255 (with Elena Ríos Camacho & Tony Mueller).2024-02-22T10:00:28+00:00

Abstract

Over the past decade, the European Union (EU) made significant strides in economic and fiscal policy integration without formal treaty-based changes. After the euro crisis, member states granted the European Central Bank banking supervisory powers. During the pandemic, they entrusted the European Commission with raising EU debt through NextGenerationEurope. This article examines the empowerment of supranational institutions as a deliberate adjustment to disruptive circumstances. By so doing, it demonstrates that empowerment can happen through legislative acts and joint decisions by member states. The study reveals that when states have multiple agent options, like in the banking union, they select the institution they trust the most. Conversely, in nested delegation games, extensive monitoring and reporting requirements, as in the case of NextGenerationEurope, are aimed at avoiding the defection of single member states, what we call ”principal slack”, at the implementation stage.

2023: Europe’s Global Gateway: A New Instrument of Geopolitics, Politics and Governance, 11(4): 1-12.2023-11-22T14:12:28+00:00

Abstract

In December 2021, the EU member states agreed on the Global Gateway strategy to mobilize public and private funds of up to €300 billion between 2021 and 2027, to invest in digital, climate and energy, transport, health, education, and research fields. With a geographical focus on Africa, Global Gateway links infrastructure investment projects with condition principles—including democratic values, good governance, and transparency—and catalyzes private investment into EU development financing. Against this backdrop, this study explores why EU member states agreed on this new geopolitical instrument. This piece posits that the confluence of three factors enabled the creation of Global Gateway. First, the EU established this new instrument to counter China’s role as a global infrastructure lender in Africa. Second, Global Gateway was possible through the shift to private investment in multilateral development financing. Equally important for the establishment of Global Gateway was the European Commission’s transformational leadership as an entrepreneurial agent in designing this geopolitical strategy of the EU’s power projection. The conclusion outlines future research avenues and enables readers to consider the wider prospects and caveats of the Global Gateway strategy.

2022: Orchestrating Private Investors for Development: How the World Bank Revitalizes, Regulation & Governance 16(4): 1382-1398 (with Thomas Dörfler).2022-10-19T10:56:27+00:00

Abstract

Confronted with a new wave of criticism on the in effectiveness of its development programs, the World Bank embarked on a revitalization process, turning to private investors to finance International Development Association projects and widening its mandate. To explain these adaptation strategies of the World Bank to regain relevance, this piece draws on organizational ecology and orchestration scholarship. We contend that international organizations rely on two adaptation mechanisms, orchestration and scope expansion, when they lose their role as focal actors in an issue area. We find that the World Bank has indeed lost market share and has relied on these two mechanisms to revitalize itself. We show that the World Bank responded to changes in the environment by orchestrating a private sector-oriented capital increase, prioritizing private funding for development through a “cascade approach,” and expanding the scope of its mandate into adjacent domains of transnational governance, including climate change and global health.

2022: When Do International Organizations Engage in Agency Slack? A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of United Nations Institutions, Global Studies Quarterly 2(3) (with Patrick Mello, Anna Novoselova, Omar Ramon Serrano Oswald).2022-08-31T14:03:50+00:00

The extensive delegation of power to international organizations (IOs) has been accompanied by occasional agency slack. While prior studies suggest that IOs’ propensity for agency slack may be rooted in their organizational characteristics, this has rarely been explored empirically. To address this lacuna, in this article we propose a conceptualization and measurement of agency slack and develop a framework of organizational characteristics. Our empirical analysis applies qualitative comparative analysis to assess the conditions under which agency slack occurs across sixteen United Nations institutions. We complement the cross-case analysis with two case illustrations. Our results document the empirical existence of two paths to agency slack, providing confirmatory evidence for our theoretical expectations. Path 1 combines staffing rules that are favorable for the agent with wide access to third parties. Path 2 entails the combination of favorable staffing rules with extensive delegation of authority and a vague organizational mandate.

2022: Bringing Independence and Accountability Together: Mission Impossible for the European Central Bank?, Journal of European Integration 44(6): 837-853 (with Tony Mueller).2022-09-05T07:35:05+00:00

Abstract

The European Central Bank’s (ECB) role as a political actor during the euro crisis raised concerns about its independence and insufficient accountability. Against this backdrop, the article investigates how and why the ECB reacted to demands for more accountability during and following the crisis. To this end, we revisit the independence-accountability nexus, adding three qualifications to the conventional wisdom that independence and accountability do not go together. First, recurring to the governor’s dilemma, we argue that a delegation relationship characterized by a high level of independence favours competence over controllability. Second, we open the black box of accountability by investigating the extent to which the ECB made the strategic choice to improve selected accountability dimensions. Third, against the commonsensical view that ECB accountability mechanisms are underdeveloped, this piece shows that certain accountability dimensions have been continuously improved to defend independence. The findings contribute to the literature on accountability and the causes and consequences of delegating power to supranational institutions.

2022: Measuring Actual Discretion of the European Commission: Using the Discretion Index to Guide Empirical Research, European Union Politics 23(3), 541-558 (with Markus Gastinger).2022-08-31T14:01:24+00:00

One key question in the study of the European Union has always been the extent of Commission discretion. We take the discretion index, typically used by principal–agent scholars to measure the Commission’s designed discretion, to measure its actual discretion. Commission designed discretion can today be computationally generated with sufficient accuracy across all secondary acts. The study of designed discretion thus reaches considerable maturity. Therefore, we argue that scholars should prioritize studying Commission actual discretion. We present a systematic and transparent investigative technique based on the discretion index, which we use as a roadmap to guide our empirical investigation. The index facilitates the accumulation of knowledge across policy areas and time by providing exact values for Commission discretion. We illustrate our approach with the Development Cooperation Instrument.

2022: Persistence Against the Odds: How Entrepreneurial Agents Helped the UN Joint Inspection Unit to Prevail, Global Policy 13(2), 235-246 (with Patrick Mello, Anna Novoselova, Omar Ramon Serrano Oswald).2022-05-05T14:05:57+00:00

Abstract

Since its inception in 1966, the United Nations Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) has prevailed in the face of significant existential challenges. Against this backdrop, we investigate how and why the JIU persisted over time. Combining delegation and historical institutionalist approaches, we posit that entrepreneurial agents and layering processes together help us better understand persistence of international organizations. Based on semi-structured interviews with UN staff and JIU inspectors, we examine three critical junctures in the history of the JIU. Our results show that entrepreneurial agents and stakeholders in the JIU managed to avoid the closure or demotion of the JIU by engaging in a strategy of institutional layering. Our analysis, however, also demonstrates that the JIU survived at the price of losing its privilege as the central UN oversight body. These findings have implications for the study of international organizations and for the reform of the UN system at large.

2022: The Limits of Transparency: Expert Knowledge and Meaningful Accountability in Central Banking, Government and Opposition, 57(2), 217-232. doi:10.1017/gov.2020.36 (with Lisa Herzog).2022-03-08T16:45:48+00:00

Abstract

Recent discussions of accountability in contexts of expert knowledge raise questions about the limits of transparency. Against this background, we discuss the nexus between expert knowledge and meaningful accountability – that is, context-sensitive accountability based on a genuine understanding of a situation. We argue that the concentration of expertise in certain institutions makes it difficult to hold those institutions accountable. In particular, three components challenge meaningful accountability: specialization, inaccessibility and potential biases or conflict of interest. We emphasize the role of ‘epistemic communities’ and their impact on the tension between expert knowledge and independence. Drawing on the deliberative systems literature, we discuss how expert knowledge might be communicated to outsiders to enable meaningful accountability. To illustrate our argument, we draw on the European Central Bank, a case study in which states have chosen a delegation design characterized by a high degree of independence and trust in expert knowledge, to the detriment of accountability. We sketch possible avenues for creating the conditions for meaningful accountability even in the case of institutions with highly concentrated expertise.

2021: The (Self-)empowerment of the European Central Bank During the Sovereign Debt Crisis, Journal of European Integration 43 (1): 83-98 (with Tony Mueller).2021-11-13T10:43:52+00:00

ABSTRACT

The European Central Bank (ECB) emerged from the sovereign debt crisis as one of the most powerful supranational institutions. Against this background, this article explains how and why the ECB became empowered during the euro area crisis. Building on the delegation, governor’s dilemma, and epistemic community approaches, we argue that the ECB ability to play a strong role in this empowerment process and to convince member states to entrust it with more competences was the outcome of a combination of three factors: limited cohesiveness within the collective principal (Eurogroup); a fiduciary relationship characterized by broad discretion and independence on the trustee side (ECB); and strong specialization with the ECB acting as epistemic entrepreneur. We illustrate our argument with two cases: the Trichet letters exemplify an autonomous emergency empowerment and the introduction of the single supervisory mechanism demonstrates ECB influence on institutional design decisions in negotiating processes.

 

2021: A new delegation design for EU governance: how preference cohesiveness of multiple principals shapes the European Commission’s discretion in trade negotiations, Comparative European Politics 19, 576–593.2021-11-16T14:31:02+00:00

Abstract

The Lisbon Treaty enhanced the role of the European Parliament in free trade agreements. This article offers a comprehensive theoretical and empirical account of this new delegation design in EU trade governance. Specifically, it addresses the question how the preference cohesiveness of multiple principals—the Council of Ministers as a de jure principal and the Parliament as a de facto principal—shapes the Commission’s discretion in negotiating trade agreements. Exploring these two conjectures through a combination of primary materials and interviews, this contribution posits that those configurations of low degree of cohesiveness within the Council and high cohesiveness within the Parliament or high cohesiveness of the Council and low cohesiveness within the Parliament increase Commission discretion. A configuration of low cohesiveness within and between multiple principals, by contrast, is more likely to lead to paralysis of the negotiation process.

2021: Populism as a “Corrective” to Trade Agreements? “America First” and the Readjustment of NAFTA, International Politics, doi.org/10.1057/s411311-021-00306-3 (with Robert Csehi).2021-11-13T10:47:01+00:00

Abstract

The past few years have seen an upsurge in populist politics around the globe. Yet, its potential impact on the liberal international order has been analyzed mainly from a discursive perspective, and much less is known about actual policy implications. Adopting an ideational approach to populism and taking the case of the NAFTA renegotiation process as a building block in the liberal economic order, this article studies the populist imprints of the revised agreement. First, we demonstrate how the populist division of society between ‘the corrupt elite’ and ‘the honest people’ and the emphasis on popular sovereignty were used as narrative frames in criticizing NAFTA. In a second step, through selected provisions, we show how alterations to NAFTA are considered as ‘populist corrections’ to guarantee greater representation for ‘the people’ and better safeguards for popular sovereignty under the USMCA. The article concludes with a discussion of potential implications for global trade.

2020: Reforming International Organizations: How Partisanship and Ministerial Control Shape States Preferences towards the World Bank, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 26 (4), 2020, 601–627 (with Laura Mahrenbach).2021-11-13T10:57:08+00:00

Abstract

Recent scholarship has highlighted the role of domestic pressures in determining state preferences toward the reform of international organizations (IO s). This article adds a new dimension by examining how partisanship and ministerial control affect state preferences toward IOempowerment. The article derives two expectations from the existing literature. First, partisan position will determine preferences toward IO empowerment. Second, when a government is constituted by multiple parties, the position of the party with the IO’s ministerial portfolio will determine the government’s position toward IO empowerment. The article illustrates this argument by examining the positions of four net donors (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and two net recipients (Brazil and India) during the World Bank’s reforms. By bringing domestic politics back in, this article complements existing studies on the politics of IOreform and weighs in on central debates in comparative politics and international political economy.

2020: Contested EU Trade Governance: Transparency Conundrums in TTIP Negotiations, Comparative European Politics, 18: 215-232, doi.org/10.1057/s41295-019-00183-4.2021-11-13T10:47:41+00:00

Abstract

During TTIP negotiations, the European Commission was severely criticized by civil society organizations and public opinion for its secrecy regarding negotiation strategies and priorities. The Commission responded by making some negotiating texts publicly available. This article explores the implications of increasing transparency in trade negotiations. Drawing on negotiation, politicization, and informal governance literature, it examines how the Commission’s choice for a partial transparency approach had three paradoxical effects on negotiations. First, greater transparency did not help the public perception of TTIP. Second, greater transparency increased the EU’s bargaining leverage but led to a low degree of negotiating discretion for the Commission. Finally, greater transparency transformed the nature of the negotiating process by making it more informal, allowing bargaining parties to act outside the public scrutiny. This contribution solves these transparency puzzles by showing that partial transparency is a double-edged sword. Whilst greater transparency has become an important legitimation strategy in EU trade governance, adopting a partial transparency approach fuelled public protest instead of muting it and led to the failure of the negotiations.

2019: Legacies and Innovations in Global Economic Governance Since Bretton Woods, Review of International Political Economy 26 (6): 1089-1111 (with Orfeo Fioretos).2021-11-13T10:50:48+00:00

The international economic system that emerged after the 1944 Bretton Woods conference became the most durable international arrangement devoted to economic openness. Seventy-five years after the conference, however, global shifts in power, institutional gridlock, and populist backlash figure prominently in accounts predicting the system’s demise. This article examines the legacies of the Bretton Woods conference for structures and practices of global economic governance and innovations that emerged over time to adapt the system to new political and economic circumstances. It explores how and why the Bretton Woods system became a more variegated system over time with respect to four features of governance: membership, legalization, organizational focality, and market embeddedness. It identifies sources and effects of expanding membership in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the emergence of new formal and informal institutions, the challenges of a more fragmented institutional landscape, and shifts in the underlying principles of economic governance. Finally, the article discusses lessons from past crises in and reforms to the Bretton Woods system, and their implications for understanding recent challenges to global economic cooperation.

2019: Explaining Coherence in International Regime Complexes: How the World Bank Shapes the Field of Multilateral Development Finance, Review of International Political Economy 26 (6): 1160-1186 (with Henning Schmidtke).2021-11-16T07:17:42+00:00

Abstract

The landscape of multilateral development finance has changed dramatically in the past decades. At Bretton Woods, delegates envisioned the World Bank as the focal organization mobilizing financial support for national development strategies. Today, this issue area is populated by no less than 27 multilateral development banks including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank created under Chinese leadership. This paper shows that, des- pite this institutional proliferation, the development finance regime remains largely coherent and core governance features designed at Bretton Woods continue to shape the emerging regime complex. We develop a historical institutionalist argu- ment for why newly created institutions are likely to imitate extant institutions. We suggest that states add new institutions not only in response to deficiencies in extant institutions but also to increase their control and reputation. We analyze three causal pathways – path-dependence, orchestration, and independent learning – that contribute to a coherent regime complex. We show that focal inter- national organizations can use their position to prevent incoherence.

2019: Global Democracy in Decline? How Rising Authoritarianism Limits Democratic Control over International Institutions, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 25(2): 231-254 (with Henning Schmidtke).2021-11-13T11:00:25+00:00

Abstract

Over the past decade, rising authoritarian regimes have begun to challenge the liberal international order. This challenge is particularly pronounced in the field of multilateral development finance, where China and its coalition partners from Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa have created two new multilateral development banks. This article argues that China and its partners have used the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to increase their power and to restrict democratic control mechanisms. By comparing formal mechanisms of democratic control in both organizations to the World Bank, this article shows that civil society access, transparency, and accountability are lower at the AIIB and NDB than they are at the World Bank.

2018: Rising Powers in Global Economic Governance: Mapping the Flexibility-Empowerment Nexus, Global Policy 10(1): 19-28 (with Laura C. Mahrenbach).2021-11-15T14:35:57+00:00

Abstract

Given long-standing criticism of global economic institutions by rising powers, it is puzzling that these same governments supported the transfer of substantial resources and responsibilities to the IMF and the World Bank during recent reform negotiations. We argue rising powers’ support for international organization (IO) empowerment is linked to their concerns regarding an IO’s flexibility. We introduce two types of flexibility as being most relevant for rising powers. These include governance flexibility – the extent to which rising powers may participate in IO decision-making – and issue flexibility – the extent to which rising power preferences are incorporated into IO policies and programs. We illustrate our argument by examining the preferences of the BIC states (Brazil, India and China) towards IMF and World Bank reforms between 2008 and 2012. Drawing on archival material with over 50 statements from BIC representatives, we find, first, that there were clear links between Bank and Fund governance flexibility and the BICs’ support for empowerment of these IOs, but that this was not true for issue flexibility. Second, we find evidence indicating the strategies of individual BIC governments differ within these IOs, suggesting a need to undertake more differentiated studies of rising powers’ IO activities.

2018: Lost in Internal Evaluation? Accountability and Insulation at the World Bank, Contemporary Politics 24(5): 568-587.2021-11-16T07:22:50+00:00

Abstract

Over past decades, the World Bank has been criticized by scholars, policymakers, and civil society groups for being unaccountable and inefficient. Confronted with this wave of contestation, the Bank established several internal accountability mechanisms, including the Inspection Panel, the Independent Evaluation Group, and the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman. Against this background, this article investigates how the proliferation of accountability mechanisms in a large and complex organization such as the World Bank reduces rather than enhances transparency and lines of accountability. I argue that the establishment of a myriad of accountability mechanisms has paradoxically made the Bank even more encapsulated and less accountable to the outside world. Unpacking the differential effects of external and internal accountability mechanisms makes this contribution of significant interest to scholars working on the accountability and performance of international organizations.

2017: Shaping Global Trade Governance Rules: New Powers’ Hard and Soft Strategies of Influence at the WTO, European Foreign Affairs Review, 22: 19-36, Special Issue EU and US Regulatory Power under Strain? Emerging Countries and the Limits of External Governance.2021-11-16T07:31:13+00:00

Abstract

How do new powers seek to influence global trade governance rules? In this contribution, I posit that, contrary to the EU and the US, which act predominantly as regulatory powers, rising powers use a variety of hard and soft strategies to shape global trade governance. The article finds that a combination of hard strategies, such as coalition-building or obstruction, and soft strategies, including placing their own nationals at the top of the WTO or pursuing incremental procedural changes to make trade governance more inclusive, enabled new powers to shape global trade governance rules over the past fifteen years.

2017: Measuring the Empowerment of International Organizations: The Evolution of Financial and Staff Capabilities, Global Policy 8(S5): 51-61 (with Henning Schmidtke).2021-11-16T07:39:27+00:00

Abstract

International organizations’ (IOs) power in shaping global governance outcomes is not only determined by the formal delegation of tasks and issue areas but also by the necessary capabilities to fulfill these tasks. Yet, extant research on the delegation of power to IOs gives few insights into the financial and staff capabilities of IOs and focuses mainly on the formal rules that specify IOs’ tasks and issue scope. To address these limitations, this paper makes three contributions. First, we propose a more encompassing concept of IO power which incorporates three principal components: tasks, issue scope, and capabilities. Second, we introduce a new concept – IO empowerment (IOE) – which encapsulates formal and informal changes in IO power over time. Third, we introduce a novel dataset on IO capabilities, which measures the formal rules governing IO staff and financial resources as well as the actual capabilities available to six well-known IOs over 65 years. These original data show that capabilities vary not only across IOs but also over time.

* Amongst articles published between January 2017 and December 2018, this paper received some of the most downloads in the 12 months following online publication.

2017: Regaining Control of Errant Agents? Agency Slack at the European Commission and the World Health Organization, Cooperation and Conflict 52(4): 469-484.2021-11-16T07:34:10+00:00

Under which conditions are principals able to regain control when agency slack has occured? While existing research highlights a number of important factors related to the conditions under which agents engage in slack, scholars have to a less extent investigated which causal mechanisms affect the ability of states to regain control of their errant agents. Extending the principal–agent literature, this contribution argues that the ability of principals to regain control of their agents depends on three causal mechanisms: the type of monitoring mechanisms; the extent of fragmentation within an international organization; and the credibility of sanctions available to member states. To illustrate this argument, I compare two cases of agency slack: at the European Commission during the Eurozone crisis in 2015; and at the World Health Organization in the 1990s. The findings suggest that regaining control of runaway agents after slack has occurred is easier when there is a low level of fragmentation within an organization and states have centralized monitoring mechanisms and credible sanction mechanisms, such as budgetary contractions, at their disposal.

2016: Verantwortungszurechnung im EU-Mehrebenensystem während der Eurokrise: Wer kontrollierte die Troika-Institutionen?, Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, Sonderheft Gewaltenteilung und Demokratie in der EU 26(1): 115-29.2021-11-16T07:43:22+00:00

Abstract

With the establishment of the troika institutions during the Euro crisis, issues related to possibilities for control and constraint of these institutions, as well as their accountability, became prominent. This contribution analyses the accountability of the troika institutions, that is, the extent to which agents and trustees are controlled at different levels by their principals or beneficiaries. Specifically, I distinguish between a delegation and a fiduciary mode of accountability in EU governance. While the delegation mode is characterised by formal hierarchical, supervisory and legal control mechanisms, the fiduciary mode is marked by informal peer organisations and public reputational mechanisms. In order to illustrate these two modes of accountability, this article examines a delegation relation (European Commission and Council of Ministers) and a fiduciary relation (European Central Bank and Eurozone-Member States) during the financial bailout assistance programmes.

2016: Why the European Commission is not the “unexpected winner” of the euro crisis? A comment on Bauer and Becker, Journal of European Integration 38 (1): 95-100.2021-11-16T07:52:03+00:00

Abstract

The protracted euro area crisis has led to a resurgence of academic inter- est in integration theories. In a recent piece in this journal, Bauer and Becker argue that the euro crisis allowed the European Commission to strengthen its role in eco- nomic governance, in particular with regard to its implementation powers. Contrary to Bauer and Becker’s claim, I contend that the euro crisis has resulted not in strengthening the Commission. Rather, the Commission is undergoing “subtle disem- powerment”, that is, a gradual transfer of decision-making authority and resources from the Commission to the intergovernmental level and to the European Central Bank. I illustrate the Commission’s subtle disempowerment along three dimensions: the creation of the intergovernmental European Stability Mechanism; enhanced over- sight mechanisms of the Commission via the troika constellation; and the creation of the European System of Financial Supervision, Banking Union and Single Supervisory Mechanism under the aegis of the European Central Bank.

2015: Internationale Organisationen in einer komplexen Welt – Grenzen und Mehrwert einer pluralistischen Forschung, Politische Vierteljahresschrift Sonderheft 2014 Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Band 49: 478-493 (with Martin Koch und Andrea Liese).2021-11-16T08:07:24+00:00

Abstract

Das vorliegende Sonderheft bezeugt, dass sich die Forschung zu internationalen Organisationen sowohl in theoretisch-konzeptioneller Hinsicht deutlich weiterentwickelt hat als auch Beziehungen und Interaktionen mit anderen Akteuren stärker in den Blick genommen hat.

2015: Machtverschiebung in internationalen Organisationen? Schwellenländer als Gestaltungs- und Verweigerungsmächte, Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, Heft 4, S. 101-108.2021-11-16T08:04:43+00:00

Abstract

Bislang übernahmen Schwellenländer in der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) unter der Führung Brasiliens oder Indiens eine proaktive und gestalterische Rolle, indem sie neue Punkte auf die Agenda setzten oder Koalitionen bildeten. Zur besseren Berücksichtigung ihrer ökonomischen und finanziellen Bedeutung forderten sie im Rahmen der Reformen des Internationalen Währungsfonds (IWF) und der Weltbank mehr Mitspracherecht. Unzufrieden mit den Ergebnissen dieser Reformen – und insbesondere mit deren langsamer Umsetzung – gründeten Brasilien, Russland, Indien, China und Südafrika (BRICS) im Juli 2014 einen alternativen Währungsfonds und eine neue Entwicklungsbank. Somit wurde zum ersten Mal eine Parallelstruktur zu den Bretton-Woods-Institutionen kreiert und die Vormachtstellung der USA in diesen Organisationen infrage gestellt. Diese Beispiele verdeutlichen, dass die alte, liberale, von den USA dominierte internationale Ordnung unter Anpassungsdruck steht und Machtverschiebungen in der globalen Governance stattfinden. Ferner zeigen sie, dass sich Schwellenländer nicht mehr als „rule-takers”, sondern vielmehr als „rule-makers” (Schirm 2005) verstehen.

2015: Autonomiekonzeptionen internationaler Organisationen im Vergleich, Politische Vierteljahresschrift Sonderheft 2014 Internationale Organisationen, Band 49: 28-53 (with Michael W. Bauer und Jörn Ege).2021-11-16T08:11:23+00:00

Abstract

Der viel beschworene Trend des zunehmenden Aufgabentransfers an internationale Organisationen hat dazu geführt, dass diese in der akademischen Debatte (wieder) verstärkt als ‚Organisationen‘ betrachtet werden (Benner et al. 2009; Biermann u. Siebenhüner 2009; Brechin u. Ness 2013; Dingwerth et al. 2009; Liese u. Weinlich 2006). Dass internationale Organisationen in jüngerer Zeit in wachsendem Maße Einfluss auf die multilaterale Politikgestaltung ausüben, wird dabei mit Blick auf die Praxis gar nicht bestritten. Theoretisch interessant sind folglich die Bedingungen, unter denen sie Einfluss eigenständig und autonom ausüben können (Hawkins et al. 2006; Hooghe u. Marks 2014) sowie die Frage, wann und wie Prozesse institutioneller Ermächtigung im Zeitverlauf vonstattengehen (Conceição-Heldt 2013a).

2015: Internationale Organisationen als Forschungsgegenstand. Oder „Über Blinde und die Gestalt des Elefanten“, Politische Vierteljahresschrift Sonderheft 2014 Internationale Organisationen, Band 49: 4-27 (with Martin Koch und Andrea Liese).2021-11-16T08:03:16+00:00

Abstract

Im Zentrum dieses PVS-Sonderhefts steht die Frage nach der veränderten Rolle internationaler Organisationen und den Konsequenzen ihres Handelns in der bzw. für die Weltpolitik. Wurde bis in die 1980er Jahre vor allem die Koordinationsfunktion internationaler Organisationen an Schnittstellen zwischen Staaten thematisiert, lässt sich seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges eine Zunahme der an internationale Organisationen übertragenen Aufgaben und Kompetenzen beobachten, die nicht an den staatlichen Grenzen haltmachen, sondern über diese hinaus in Gesellschaften hineinwirken (Zürn 2010). Währenddessen hat sich der Aktionsrahmen internationaler Organisationen erweitert, indem sie etwa Normen für nichtstaatliche Akteure generieren, die Regeldurchsetzung und Implementierung aktiv unterstützen, als Mittler zwischen streitenden Staaten fungieren, zu immer mehr politischen Themen Informationen sammeln und bereitstellen, politische und gesellschaftliche Entwicklungen überwachen und immer häufiger auch Sanktionen legitimieren oder verhängen.

2014: When Speaking with a Single Voice Isn’t Enough: Bargaining Power (A)symmetry and EU External Effectiveness in Global Trade Governance, Journal of European Public Policy 21(7): 980-995.2021-11-16T08:16:43+00:00

Abstract

Does the European Union (EU) need to be a cohesive actor internally in order to be effective in global trade governance? And is internal cohesiveness a necessary and sufficient condition for the Union’s external effectiveness? Even though these questions are central to explaining the EU’s effectiveness, only few studies have dealt with it. In this contribution, I argue that internal cohesiveness is not a sufficient condition for EU external effectiveness. The bargaining configuration, determined by bargaining power symmetry or asymmetry, equally conditions effectiveness. This argument is illustrated by two case studies with varying bargaining power. The findings demonstrate, first, that high internal cohesiveness and bargaining power asymmetry can lead to high effectiveness, as in the EU–Mexico negotiations. Second, they show that, under a relationship of bargaining power symmetry, high cohesiveness is not a sufficient condition for external effectiveness to occur, as is evident in the Doha round.

2014: Speaking with a Single Voice: Internal Cohesiveness and External Effectiveness of the EU in Global Governance, Journal of European Public Policy 21(7): 961-979 (with Sophie Meunier).2021-11-16T08:13:40+00:00
2013: Emerging Powers in WTO Negotiations: The Domestic Sources of Trade Policy Preferences, The International Trade Journal Special Issue on the WTO, 27(5): 431-449.2021-11-16T08:38:50+00:00
2013: Two-Level Games and Trade Cooperation: What Do We Now Know?, International Politics, 50(4): 579-599.2021-11-16T08:24:32+00:00

Abstract

A large body of literature in international relations has attempted to explain the interaction between domestic politics and International Relations in the field of trade policy. This article provides new critical insight into the literature on two-level games published during the last 25 years and their contribution to the study of international trade cooperation. I will outline the relevant two-level games literature to establish what we already know about international bargaining and domestic sources of multilateral trade cooperation. I first examine two major perspectives, the domestic political approach and the systemic (international) perspective by presenting a critical review of the literature. I then identify new avenues for theoretical and empirical research in the field. I suggest that to bridge the present rigid division between Comparative Politics and International Relations we need two-level games studies in the following areas: cross-country comparisons on domestic political processes; actor interactions at different levels; comparison of international bargaining processes; and middle-range theory-building.

2013: The Domestic Sources of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Explaining Brazil’s Negotiating Position in the Doha Round, The International Trade Journal, 27(2), 173-194.2021-11-16T08:23:43+00:00

Abstract

Under the Cardoso presidency (1995–2002), Brazil adopted a reactive and defensive posture on trade liberalization. However, when Lula da Silva came into power in 2003, Brazil took a more offensive and proactive position on the issue in creating the G-20 and putting forward proposals of its own. How can this shift in the Brazilian negotiating position be explained? The main argument is that under the Lula da Silva administration, Brazil’s position in the Doha round primarily reflected domestic political constraints on multilateral trade cooperation. Three domestic dynamics shaped the national preference for Brazil: a heterogeneous governing coalition with a high number of veto players, divisions within the Workers’ Party, and the demands of interest groups. This explanation is discussed on the basis of Brazil’s negotiating position in WTO negotiations from 2003 to 2006.

2013: Do Agents “Run Amok”? Agency Slack in the EU and US Trade Policy in the Doha Round, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 15(1): 21-36.2021-11-16T08:19:47+00:00
2013: The Clash of Negotiations: The Impact of Outside Options on Multilateral Trade Negotiations, International Negotiation Special Issue on Bilateral and Regional Economic Negotiations, 18 (1), 111-130.2021-11-16T08:33:17+00:00

Abstract

While the number of preferential trade agreements (PTA) has increased rapidly in recent years, the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations has been deadlocked since 2006. Most PTAs were even concluded after the start of the Doha round. Does the shift to PTAs “marginalize” the multilateral system? And is there a clash between preferential and multilateral trade liberalization? To answer these questions, we build upon negotiation analysis literature, arguing that the proliferation of PTAs draws negotiating capacity away from the multilateral level and thus reduces the incentives to agree on multilateral trade agreements. The willingness of actors to move from their initial bargaining positions and make concessions at the multilateral level depends on their outside options, that is, their best or worst alternatives to a negotiated agreement. The more credible an actor’s argument that he has a good alternative to multilateralism, the greater his bargaining power will be. In order to support the argument we will analyze the negotiation process at the multilateral level and link it to PTAs under negotiation by the EU, US, Brazil, Australia, and India.

2011: Australian Trade Policy under the Howard Government: the Impact of Organized Interest Groups, Global Society, 25 (4): 515-531.2021-11-16T08:43:47+00:00

Abstract

There has been much debate in the literature about the impact of globalisation on the Australian economy, but few studies focus on the domestic determinants of Australia’s negotiating position in international trade negotiations. In order to close this gap, this article analyses the impact of organised interest groups in the Australian trade policy under the Howard government in the different World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial meetings from 1999 to 2006. In particular, the article explores the link between parties and interest groups in the Australian political system. It suggests that the Australian negotiating position reflects the demands put forward by interest groups closely linked to the government parties and the change of the international environment towards bilateral and regional trade agreements.

2011: Variation in EU Member States’ Preferences and the Commission’s Discretion in the Doha Round, Journal of European Public Policy, 18 (3): 402-418.2021-11-16T08:45:27+00:00

During the period leading up to the 2005 WTO Hong Kong ministerial meeting and the 2006 Geneva informal meeting, European Union member states became even more strongly opposed to any further concessions on agricultural issues in the Doha Trade Round. Despite this opposition, the European Commission made a further offer which included concessions on agricultural issues. Based on data collected from Agence Europe and interviews with officials from the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, this contribution shows that preference heterogeneity with two camps of nearly equal size, a vague mandate and conflicting messages from principals all give the agent more discretion at the international level.

2010: Who Controls Whom? Dynamics of Power Delegation and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics, Journal of Common Market Studies, 48 (5): 1107-1126.2021-11-16T08:48:11+00:00

Abstract

There has been considerable debate about power delegation in EU trade politics, but few studies explore the question of how and why agency losses occur. Focusing on agricultural issues in the Doha Round, this article analyses the impact of agency losses (agency shirking and agency slippage) in the process of power delegation in EU trade politics. Are agency losses the result of the delegation structure, which stimulates the agent to adopt a different position from the principals (agency slippage), or do conflict situations arise because of conflicting interests between the interests of the Member States and those of the European Commission (agency shirking)? Based on information collected from Agence Europe and interviews with European officials, the main conclusions are that: (1) the Council–Commission relationship can be conflict-laden or co-operative depending on the negotiating stage at the international level; (2) a low degree of interest alignment among Member States increases the Commission’s discretion at the international level; (3) inter-institutional conflict weakens the EU negotiating position at the international level because the other WTO members know that the EU is divided and ask for further concessions.

2008: Pension Reforms in France: The Role of Trade Unions and the Timing of the Electoral Cycle, Policy Studies, 29 (1): 19-34.2021-11-16T08:52:44+00:00
2008: Assessing the Impact of Issue Linkage in the Common Fisheries Policy, International Negotiation, 13 (2), 285-300.2021-11-16T08:51:04+00:00

Abstract

Although issue linkage is often an important variable in negotiations, it remains an underdeveloped research area in European integration studies. This article attempts to assess the impact of issue linkage on EU bargaining outcomes by applying the Tollison and Willett spatial model of issue linkage to a key bargaining situation in the common fisheries policy: the negotiations on the introduction of the common market organization and structural policy. This article attempts to demonstrate how deals can be completed through issue linkage packages and to identify the conditions that make issue linkage more likely.

2006: Verhandlungssituationen in der EU: Eine theoriegeleitete Analyse der Gemeinsamen Fischereipolitik, Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politische Wissenschaft, 12 (1): 73-103.2021-11-16T08:56:34+00:00

Abstract

Auf der Grundlage des akteurzentrierten Institutionalismus präsentiert der vorliegende Beitrag eine theoriegeleitete und empirisch angereicherte Analyse von Verhandlungsergebnissen in der EU am Beispiel der Gemeinsamen Fischereipolitik. Dabei fasst das zugrunde liegende Untersuchungsdesign die Verhandlungsergebnisse als die abhängige, die Präferenzen der Mitgliedstaaten, die Präferenzen der Kommission sowie den institutionellen Rahmen als die unabhängigen Variablen auf. Dieses Untersuchungsdesign wird dann empirisch an zwei wichtigen Verhandlungssituationen überprüft, die gleichzeitig mit der Kompetenzübertragung der Fischereipolitik auf die europäische Ebene einhergehen. In der ersten Verhandlungssituation geht es um die Einführung der Strukturpolitik und der Gemeinsamen Marktorganisation für den Fischereisektor im Jahr 1970. Bei der zweiten Verhandlungssituation steht die Einführung der Bestanderhaltungspolitik für die Fischbestände im Jahr 1983 im Mittelpunkt. Zusätzlich zu den Verhandlungspositionen der Regierungen der Mitgliedstaaten wird in diesem Beitrag anhand der Rolle der Kommission und der formellen (Einstimmigkeitsprinzip) und informellen Regeln (Schatten der Zukunft) gezeigt, wie sich diese Variablen auf die Politikergebnisse auswirken.

2006: Taking Actors’ Preferences and the Institutional Setting Seriously: the EU Common Fisheries Policy, Journal of Public Policy, 26 (3), 279-299.2021-11-16T08:59:41+00:00

Abstract

The recent bifurcation of European studies into state-centric and new institutionalist camps has resulted in a sterile theoretical debate that says little about an empirical world where bargaining outcomes cover both member states’ preferences and the institutional setting. This article is an attempt to move beyond the theoretical debate. It juxtaposes a conceptual framework for analyzing EU negotiations with an analysis of the bargaining process on the settlement of the European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy. The conceptual framework will identify a set of variables that can explain the bargaining outcome: preferences of national government representatives, preferences of the European Commission, and the institutional setting.

2006: Integrative and Distributive Bargaining in the EU: What Difference Does it Make?, Negotiation Journal, 22 (2): 145-165.2021-11-16T08:58:27+00:00

Abstract

Despite the distinction made between integrative and distributive bargaining situations in European studies literature, few studies have focused specifically on how these two situations differ. This article attempts to close this gap by examining two key bargaining situations involving fisheries that led to the Europeanization of this policy field. The integrative bargaining situation dealt with the negotiations about the structural policy and common organization of the market for fish products. In contrast, the distributive bargaining case focused on the protracted negotiations over resource conservation and management policies. The article focuses primarily on how the unanimity decision rule may affect negotiation patterns in the European Union and on how the specific type of bargaining situation affects policy outcomes. The thesis is that different bargaining tools are used to reach an agreement.

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Journal Articles
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Edited Volumes
  • 2016: O Futuro da União Europeia. Lisbon: Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos.
  • 2011: Negotiating Trade Liberalization at the WTO: Domestic Politics and Bargaining Dynamics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
  • 2004: The Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union: A Study in Integrative and Distributive Bargaining, New York & London: Routledge.
  • 1998: Dezentralisierungstendenzen in westeuropäischen Ländern. Territorialreformen Belgiens, Spaniens und Italiens im Vergleich, Berlin: Berlin Verlag A. Spitz.

  • 2019: Legacies and Innovations in Global Economic Governance Since Bretton Woods, Review of International Political Economy 26 (6) (with Orfeo Fioretos).
  • 2015: Speaking with a Single Voice: The EU as an Effective Actor in Global Governance. London/New York: Routledge (with Sophie Meunier).
  • 2015: Internationale Organisationen: Autonomie, Politisierung, Koordination und Wandel, Politische Vierteljahresschrift Sonderheft 49, Baden-Baden: Nomos (with Andrea Liese und Martin Koch).
  • 2014: Speaking with a Single Voice: The EU as an Effective Actor in Global Governance, Special Issue of the Journal of European Public Policy 21 (7) (with Sophie Meunier).
  • 2022: China und die BRICS in globalen ökonomischen Institutionen, in: Schirm, S. A.; Busch, A.; Lütz, S.; Walter, S.; Zimmermann, H. (Hrsg.) De-Globalisierung: Forschungsstand und Perspektiven, Baden Baden: Nomos, 123-138.
  • 2021: Are International Organizations the Tragic Heroes of World Politics?, in: Corinne Michaela Flick (ed.) New Global Alliances: Institutions, Alignments and Legitimacy in the Contemporary World, Wallstein Verlag, forthcoming
  • 2021: Decreasing Importance of the UN: The Rise of Informal Organizations. In: Molls, Michael et al. (eds.): Science, Reason & Sustainability. Munich: Technical University Press. forthcoming.
  • 2021: Sind internationale Organisationen die tragischen Helden der heutigen globalen Weltordnung?, in: Corinne Michaela Flick (ed.) Neue Konstellationen der Gegenwart: Annäherungen, Institutionen und Legitimität, Wallstein Verlag, 113-128.
  • 2020: Sinkende Bedeutung der UNO: Stärkung informeller Organisationen (with Tony Müller). In: Molls, Michael et al. (Hrsg.): Wissenschaft, Vernunft & Nachhaltigkeit. Technische Universität München.
  • 2019: Time in Multilateral Negotiations and International Organizations in Time, in: Klaus H. Goetz (ed.) Oxford Handbook of Time and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • 2018: Two-Level Games in Foreign Policy Analysis, in: Cameron Thies (ed.) Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/97801902228637.013.496 (with Patrick Mello).
  • 2017: Multiple Principals’ preferences, Types of Control Mechanisms, and Agent’s Discretion in Trade Negotiations, in: Tom Delreux and Johan Adriaensen (eds.): The Principal Agent Model and the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 203-226.
  • 2016: The European Agricultural Fortress under Attack, in: Hubert Zimmermann and Andreas Dür (eds.), Key Controversies in European Integration, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
  • 2013: Adaptation and Change in EU Trade Governance: The EU’s Paradigm Shift from Multilateralism to Regionalism and Bilateralism, in: Manuela Moschella and Catherine Weaver (eds.) Handbook of Global Economic Governance, London: Routledge, 57-69.
  • 2012: EU Agricultural and Fisheries Policies: An Economic and Environmental Disaster!, in: Hubert Zimmermann and Andreas Dür (eds.): Key Controversies in European Integration, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 35-244.
  • 2010: Portugal: An Active and Influential Parliament?, in: Bjørn Eric Rasch and George Tsebelis (eds.): The Role of Governments in Legislative Agenda Setting, New York & London: Routledge.
  • 2007: France: the Importance of the Electoral Cycle, in: Ellen M. Immergut, Karen Anderson and Isabelle Schulze (eds.): The Handbook of West European Pension Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 150-199.
  • 2012: Dür, Andreas Protection for Exporters. Power and Discrimination in Transatlantic Trade Relations, 1930-2010, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 53(3): 555-557
  • 2011: Zimmermann, Hubert Drachenzähmung: Die EU und die USA in den Verhandlungen um die Integration Chinas in den Welthandel, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 52(1): 149-150.

  • Survival and Resilience of the UN Joint Inspection Unit over Time (with Patrick A. Mello, Anna Novoselova, & Omar Ramon Serrano Oswald), ECPR 14th General Conference, Panel: International Organizations in Times of Crisis, August 2020.
  • The European Central Bank during the sovereign debt crisis: Revisiting the independence- accountability nexus, paper presented at EUSA Biennial Conference, Denver, 9-11 May, 2019 (with Tony Mueller).
  • The systematic study of Commission discretion using principal-agent theory: lessons from the EU’s development cooperation policy, paper presented at EUSA Biennial Conference, Denver, 9- 11 May, 2019.
  • The Complex Relationship between Independence and Accountability: Mission Impossible for the European Central Bank?, paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research 2019 Joint Sessions, UCL Mons, Belgium, April 08-12, 2019 (with Tony Mueller).
  • How Organizational Structure Affects Agency Slack: A Fuzzy-Set Ideal-Type Analysis of International Bureaucracies, paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research 2019 Joint Sessions, UCL Mons, Belgium, April 08-12, 2019 (with Patrick Mello, Omar Serrano, Anna Novoselova).
  • Privatization of Development Governance: Adaptation Strategies of the World Bank in Turbulent Times, paper presented at the International Studies Association 2019, Toronto, March 25-30, 2019 (with Thomas Doerfler).
  • Back to Bretton Woods: How Institutional Proliferation Has Increased the Resilience of the World Bank, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 30-September 2, 2018. (with Henning Schmidtke).
  • European Policy Failure during the Refugee Crisis: Partial Empowerment, Reluctant Agents, a Cacophony of Voices, and Unilateral Action, EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2018/36, 2018.
  • Independence, Accountability, and Legitimacy: Mission Impossible for the European Central Bank?, paper presented at the 25th International Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, March 28- 30, 2018 and at the ECPR Standing Groups Sciences Po, June 13-15, 2018 (with Tony Müller).
  • European Policy Failure during the Refugee Crisis: Partial Empowerment, Reluctant Agents, a Cacophony of Voices, and Unilateral Action, paper presented at the 25th International Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, March 28-30, 2018 and at the ECPR Standing Groups Sciences Po, June 13-15, 2018.
  • The EU Performance During the Refugee Crisis, paper presented at the 25th International Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, March 28-30, 2018 (with Vittoria Meissner).
  • Global Democracy in Decline? How Rising Authoritarianism limits Democratic Control over Multilateral Development Banks, paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, April 4-7, 2018 (with Henning Schmidtke).
  • EU Governance in Crisis Mode: Disempowering the European Commission, paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, September 6-9, 2017.
  • Contested Multilateralism and the World Bank: Explaining the Establishment of the New Development Bank, paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, September 6 – 9, 2017 and at the DVPW IP-Sektionstagung, October 4-6, 2017.
  • Power without Control? Explaining variety of accountability mechanisms across troika institutions, paper presented at the European Workshops in International Studies, Accountability in Global Governance, Cardiff, June 07-10, 2017.
  • The Systematic Study of Commission Discretion using Principal–Agent Theory: Lessons from the EU’s Development Cooperation Policy, paper presented at the EUSA Biennial Conference, Miami, 4-6 May, 2017 (with Markus Gastinger).
  • Disintegration Dynamics in Europe? Mass Migration, Cacophony of Voices, and External Spill- Back Processes, paper presented at the EUSA Biennial Conference, Miami, 4-6 May, 2017.
  • The Silent Empowerment of the ECB During the Euro Crisis, paper presented at the EUSA Biennial Conference, Miami, 4-6 May, 2017 (with Tony Müller).
  • Explaining the Empowerment of International Organizations” ISA Annual Convention, Baltimore, February 22-25, 2017 (with Henning Schmidtke).
  • Rise and Decline of Old Bretton Woods Institutions: Dysfunctionality and Insulation at the World Bank ISA Annual Convention, Baltimore, February 22-25, 2017.
  • Exploring the Paradox of Increasing Transparency in TTIP Negotiations, paper presented at the Council for European Studies 23rd International Conference for Europeanists, Philadelphia, April 14-16 and at the Interdisciplinary Conference on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) at the University of Gothenburg March 14-15, 2016.
  • Empowering International Organizations, paper presented at the 57th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, March 16-19, 2016 and University of Munich Workshop on “Resourcing International Organizations” 2016 (with Henning Schmidtke).
  • Partisan Orientation of Old and New Power Governments towards Empowerment at the World Bank, paper presented at the 57th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, March 16-19, 2016 (with Laura Mahrenbach).
  • Variation Without Influence? (In)formal Policy-making in EU Development Cooperation, paper presented at the Council for European Studies 23rd International Conference for Europeanists, Philadelphia, April 14-16 (with Markus Gastinger).
  • How Effective are Informal Coalitions in Global Governance? Rising Powers as shapers of global health rules, paper presented at the 57th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, March 16-19, 2016 (with André Isidro).
  • The World Health Organization’s adaptive capacity in a complex inter-organizational environment” paper presented at the 57th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, March 16-19, 2016 (with André Isidro).
  • Lost in Internal Evaluation: Accountability and Insulation at the World Bank, Paper presented at the workshop, “The Transformative Power of Regulatory Governance”, Copenhagen Business School, February 4-5, 2016.
  • Negotiating Styles of Rising Powers in Global Economic Governance, paper presented at the Workshop “From Rule-Takers to Rule-Makers: Emerging Powers in the Regulation of International Trade”, University of Geneva February 9-10, 2016.
  • Emerging Power Preferences towards Institutional Empowerment of International Organizations, paper presented at the ISA 2015 Annual Convention, New Orleans, February 18-21, 2015 (with Laura Mahrenbach).
  • Accountable to Whom and How? Logics of Accountability in EU Governance during the Sovereign Debt Crisis, paper presented at the AKI-DVPW and Comparative Politics joint conference „Gewaltenteilung und Demokratie im Mehrebenensystem der EU – neu, anders – oder weniger legitim?, FU Berlin, 9-10 October 2014 and updated version to be presented at the European Union Studies Association, Boston 5-7 March 2015.
  • Internationale Organisationen als Forschungsgegenstand. Oder “Über Blinde und die Gestalt des Elefanten”, paper presented at the International Relations Session of the Deutsche Vereinigung für Politikwissenschaft, Magdeburg 25-27 September 2014.
  • Acting on Behalf of Collective and Multiple Principals: The European’s Commission Discretion after Lisbon, paper presented at the Workshop The EU in International Negotiations, Global Governance Program, European University Institute (EUI), 23-24 Juni 2014 and updated version to be presented at the European Union Studies Association, Boston 5-7 March 2015.
  • The Perils of Delegation: Using Oversight Mechanisms to Minimize Agency Slack, paper presented at the Eurofort Workshop on European Integration, Princeton University and HU Berlin joint conference, July 21, 2014.
  • Controlling International Organizations after Delegation of Power: The Use of Oversight Mechanisms to Minimize Agency Losses, paper to be presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Salamanca, 11-14 April 2014.
  • Internal Cohesiveness and External Effectiveness of the EU in World Politics, paper presented at the Conference for European Studies, Washington D.C., 14-16 March 2014.
  • A Cacophony of Voices? The EU’s Cohesiveness in the Negotiation of Bilateral and Multilateral Trade Agreements, paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, 3-6 April 2013 and at the European Union Studies Association, Baltimore, 9-11 May 2013.
  • Delegation of Power to International Organizations and Institutional Empowerment over Time: A Research Design, paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, 3-6 April 2013.
  • Delegation of Power to International Organizations and Institutional Empowerment over Time, paper presented at the die European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Mainz, 12- 15 March 2013.
  • The EU as a Global Actor: The Impact of Asymmetrical Bargaining Power and BATNAS on Trade Agreements, paper presented at the Conference for European Studies, Boston, 22-24 March 2012.
  • The EU as an Actor in the Negotiation of Trade Agreements: Asymmetrical Bargaining Power and Best Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement, paper presented at the Workshop “Regional Organizations as Global Players: Active=Influential?”, Zeuthen, 28-29 October 2011.
  • Do Agents Run Amok? Explaining Different Forms of Delegation of Power to International Organizations and Agency Slack over Time, paper presented at the Workshop “Public Administration in the Multilevel System”, Humboldt University Berlin, 23-24 June 2011.
  • Embedding International Institutions in Time: the Impact of Time Rules on Multilateral Trade Negotiations, paper presented at the Workshop “Institutional Dynamics in World Politics: Explaining Variation in Scope, Pace, and Direction of International Institutional Change” at the Social Science Research Center (Wissenschaftszentrum [WZB]), Berlin, 7-8 April 2011.
  • Delegation of Power to International Organizations: Control Gaps, Agents’ Discretion and Autonomy in the Principal-Agent Relationship over Time, paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Montréal, 15-19 March 2011.
  • Embedding International Negotiations in Time: Stages of Negotiation, Time Pressure, BATNA, and Time Horizons Effects on Barganing Outcomes, paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Montréal, 15-19 March 2011.
  • The WTO at the Crossroads? Negotiating under the Shadow of Time and Domestic Political Constraints, paper presented at the conference “Myth or Reality? The Promise of Economic Multilateralism” at the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 20-21 December 2010.
  • Delegation of Power to International Organizations: Agency Losses and Unintended Consequences over Time, paper presented at the SGIR 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference, Stockholm, 9-11 September 2010.
  • Explaining the Doha Impasse: The Impact of Domestic Political Institutions on the EU, U.S., Brazilian and Australian Negotiating Positions, paper presented at the SGIR 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference, Stockholm, 9-11 September 2010.
  • The Commission-as-Agent at the Interface between Internal EU Decision-Making and External WTO Negotiations: An Analysis of Tactical Opportunities and Agency Losses, paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, New Orleans, 17-21 February 2010.
  • Delegation and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics, EUI Working Paper, San Domenico, Fiesole: RSCAS 2009/18.
  • Who Controls Whom? Dynamics of Power Delegation and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics, paper presented at the Second Conference on the Political Economy of International Organizations, Geneva, 29-31 January 2009.
  • On the Time Dimension of International Trade Negotiations, paper presented at the Workshop Political Science and Political Time, University of Potsdam, 2-3 April 2009.
  • Agricultural Trade Liberalization and the Doha Round: A Two-level Game Analysis of the EU Negotiating Position, paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Lisbon, 14-19 April 2009.
  • Delegation of Power to International Organizations: Agency Losses and Unintended Consequences, paper presented at the 8ste Nederlands-Belgisch PoliticologenEtmaal, Nijmegen, 28-29 May 2009.
  • Delegation of Power to Supranational Institutions: Agency Shirking or Agency Slippage?, paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Rennes, 11-16 April 2008.
  • Die Interaktion von Innen- und Außenpolitik in den internationalen Beziehungen: eine historisch- institutionalistische Analyse der WTO-Agrarverhandlungen 1995-2005, paper presented at the International Relations Session of the Deutsche Vereinigung für Politikwissenschaft, Mannheim, 6- 7 October 2005.
  • Executive Supremacy in the French Legislature: The Impact of Institutional Procedures in the Reform of the French Welfare State, paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Granada, 14-19 April 2005.
  • Die Interaktion zwischen Akteurspräferenzen und dem institutionellen Rahmen in EU- Verhandlungen am Beispiel der Gemeinsamen Fischereipolitik, paper presented at the conference „Forschungslogik und Methoden der Internationalen Beziehungen und der Europaforschung”, Hofgeismar, 2-4 April 2003.
  • Die Reform der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik: Anpassungsbedarf und Reformvorschläge. Berlin: Institut für Europäische Politik, 2003.
  • France: Some Failed and Successful Attempts to Reform the French Pensions System, paper presented at the Workshop on Pension Politics, Humboldt-University, 7-8 December 2003.
  • The EU Negotiation Process: Interests, Institutions, Decision Rules, and Iterated Bargaining, paper presented at the BP Transatlantic Programme Workshop for Advanced Ph.D. Students on EU Politics, European University Institute, 7-8 June 2002.
  • A Micro-model of the EU Negotiation Process: Interests, Institutional Rules and Iterated Bargaining – The Case of Fisheries, European Consortium for Political Research, Standing Group on Analytical Politics and Public Choice, Working Paper 26, 2001.

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